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Abstract
While recent developments in autonomous vehicle (AV) technology highlight substantial
progress, we lack tools for rigorous and scalable testing. Real-world testing, the de facto eval-
uation environment, places the public in danger, and, due to the rare nature of accidents, will
require billions of miles in order to statistically validate performance claims. We implement a
simulation framework that can test an entire modern autonomous driving system, including, in
particular, systems that employ deep-learning perception and control algorithms. Using adap-
tive importance-sampling methods to accelerate rare-event probability evaluation, we estimate
the probability of an accident under a base distribution governing standard traffic behavior.
We demonstrate our framework on a highway scenario, accelerating system evaluation by 2-20
times over naive Monte Carlo sampling methods and 10-300P times (where P is the number of
processors) over real-world testing.
1 Introduction
Recent breakthroughs in deep learning have accelerated the development of autonomous vehi-
cles (AVs); many research prototypes now operate on real roads alongside human drivers. While
advances in computer-vision techniques have made human-level performance possible on narrow
perception tasks such as object recognition, several fatal accidents involving AVs underscore the
importance of testing whether the perception and control pipeline—when considered as a whole sys-
tem—can safely interact with humans. Unfortunately, testing AVs in real environments, the most
straightforward validation framework for system-level input-output behavior, requires prohibitive
amounts of time due to the rare nature of serious accidents [49]. Concretely, a recent study [29]
argues that AVs need to drive “hundreds of millions of miles and, under some scenarios, hundreds
of billions of miles to create enough data to clearly demonstrate their safety.” Alteratively, formally
verifying an AV algorithm’s “correctness” [34, 2, 47, 37] is difficult since all driving policies are sub-
ject to crashes caused by other drivers [49]. It is unreasonable to ask that the policy be safe under
all scenarios. Unfortunately, ruling out scenarios where the AV should not be blamed is a task
subject to logical inconsistency, combinatorial growth in specification complexity, and subjective
assignment of fault.
Motivated by the challenges underlying real-world testing and formal verification, we consider
a probabilistic paradigm—which we call a risk-based framework—where the goal is to evaluate
the probability of an accident under a base distribution representing standard traffic behavior. By
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assigning learned probability values to environmental states and agent behaviors, our risk-based
framework considers performance of the AV’s policy under a data-driven model of the world. To
efficiently evaluate the probability of an accident, we implement a photo-realistic and physics-based
simulator that provides the AV with perceptual inputs (e.g. video and range data) and traffic
conditions (e.g. other cars and pedestrians). The simulator allows parallelized, faster-than-real-
time evaluations in varying environments (e.g. weather, geographic locations, and aggressiveness of
other cars).
Formally, we let P0 denote the base distribution that models standard traffic behavior and
X ∼ P0 be a realization of the simulation (e.g. weather conditions and driving policies of other
agents). For an objective function f : X → R that measures “safety”—so that low values of f(x)
correspond to dangerous scenarios—our goal is to evaluate the probability of a dangerous event
pγ := P0(f(X) ≤ γ) (1)
for some threshold γ. Our risk-based framework is agnostic to the complexity of the ego-policy
and views it as a black-box module. Such an approach allows, in particular, deep-learning based
perception systems that make formal verification methods intractable.
An essential component of this approach is to estimate the base distribution P0 from data;
we use public traffic data collected by the US Department of Transportation [36]. While such
datasets do not offer insights into how AVs interact with human agents—this is precisely why we
design our simulator—they illustrate the range of standard human driving behavior that the base
distribution P0 must model. We use imitation learning [45, 41, 42, 22, 6] to learn a generative
model for the behavior (policy) of environment vehicles; unlike traditional imitation learning, we
train an ensemble of models to characterize a distribution of human-like driving policies.
As serious accidents are rare (pγ is small), we view this as a rare-event simulation [4] problem;
naive Monte Carlo sampling methods require prohibitively many simulation rollouts to generate
dangerous scenarios and estimate pγ . To accelerate safety evaluation, we use adaptive importance-
sampling methods to learn alternative distributions Pθ that generate accidents more frequently.
Specifically, we use the cross-entropy algorithm [44] to iteratively approximate the optimal impor-
tance sampling distribution. In contrast to simple classical settings [44, 55] which allow analytic
updates to Pθ, our high-dimensional search space requires solving convex optimization problems
in each iteration (Section 2). To address numerical instabilities of importance sampling estima-
tors in high dimensions, we carefully design search spaces and perform computations in logarithmic
scale. Our implementation produces 2-20 times as many rare events as naive Monte Carlo methods,
independent of the complexity of the ego-policy.
In addition to accelerating evaluation of pγ , learning a distribution Pθ that frequently generates
realistic dangerous scenarios Xi ∼ Pθ is useful for engineering purposes. The importance-sampling
distribution Pθ not only efficiently samples dangerous scenarios, but also ranks them according to
their likelihoods under the base distribution P0. This capability enables a deeper understanding of
failure modes and prioritizes their importance to improving the ego-policy.
As a system, our simulator allows fully distributed rollouts, making our approach orders of
magnitude cheaper, faster, and safer than real-world testing. Using the asynchronous messaging
library ZeroMQ [21], our implementation is fully-distributed among available CPUs and GPUs; our
rollouts are up to 30P times faster than real time, where P is the number of processors. Combined
with the cross-entropy method’s speedup, we achieve 10-300P speedup over real-world testing.
In what follows, we describe components of our open-source toolchain, a photo-realistic simula-
tor equipped with our data-driven risk-based framework and cross-entropy search techniques. The
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Figure 1. Multi-lane highway driving on I-80: (left) real image, (right) rendered image from simu-
lator
toolchain can test an AV as a whole system, simulating the driving policy of the ego-vehicle by
viewing it as a black-box model. The use of adaptive-importance sampling methods motivates a
unique simulator architecture (Section 3) which allows real-time updates of the policies of environ-
ment vehicles. In Section 4, we test our toolchain by considering an end-to-end deep-learning-based
ego-policy [9] in a multi-agent highway scenario. Figure 1 shows one configuration of this scenario
in the real world along with rendered images from the simulator, which uses Unreal Engine 4 [17].
Our experiments show that we accelerate the assessment of rare-event probabilities with respect to
naive Monte Carlo methods as well as real-world testing. We believe our open-source framework is
a step towards a rigorous yet scalable platform for evaluating AV systems, with the broader goal
of understanding how to reliably deploy deep-learning systems in safety-critical applications.
2 Rare-event simulation
To motivate our risk-based framework, we first argue that formally verifying correctness of a AV
system is infeasible due to the challenge of defining “correctness.” Consider a scenario where an
AV commits a traffic violation to avoid collision with an out-of-control truck approaching from
behind. If the ego-vehicle decides to avoid collision by running through a red light with no further
ramifications, is it “correct” to do so? The “correctness” of the policy depends on the extent to
which the traffic violation endangers nearby humans and whether any element of the “correctness”
specification explicitly forbids such actions. That is, “correctness” as a binary output is a concept
defined by its exceptions, many elements of which are subject to individual valuations [10].
Instead of trying to verify correctness, we begin with a continuous measure of safety f : X → R,
where X is space of traffic conditions and behaviors of other vehicles. The prototypical example
in this paper is the minimum time-to-collision (TTC) (see Appendix A for its definition) to other
environmental agents over a simulation rollout. Rather than requiring safety for all x ∈ X , we
relax the deterministic verification problem into a probabilistic one where we are concerned with
the probability under standard traffic conditions that f(X) goes below a safety threshold. Given a
distribution P0 on X , our goal is to estimate the rare event probability pγ := P0(f(X) ≤ γ) based
on simulated rollouts f(X1), . . . , f(Xn). As accidents are rare and pγ is near 0, we treat this as a
rare-event simulation problem; see [11, 4, Chapter VI] for an overview of this topic.
First, we briefly illustrate the well-known difficulty of naive Monte Carlo simulation when pγ is
small. From a sample Xi
iid∼ P0, the naive Monte Carlo estimate is p̂N,γ := 1N
∑N
i=1 1 {f(Xi) ≤ γ}.
As pγ is small, we use relative accuracy to measure our performance, and the central limit theorem
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Algorithm 1 Cross-Entropy Method
1: Input: Quantile ρ ∈ (0, 1), Stepsizes {αk}k∈N, Sample sizes {Nk}k∈N, Number of iterations K
2: Initialize: θ0 ∈ Θ
3: for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,K − 1 do
4: Sample Xk,1, . . . ,Xk,Nk
iid∼ Pθk
5: Set γk as the minimum of γ and the ρ-quantile of f(Xk,1), . . . , f(Xk,Nk)
6: θk+1 = argmaxθ∈Θ
{
αkθ
⊤Dk+1 + (1− αk)θ⊤∇A(θk)−A(θ)
}
implies the relative accuracy is approximately∣∣∣∣ p̂N,γpγ − 1
∣∣∣∣ dist≈
√
1− pγ
Npγ
|Z|+ o(1/
√
N) for Z ∼ N (0, 1).
For small pγ , we require a sample of size N & 1/(pγǫ
2) to achieve ǫ-relative accuracy, and if f(X)
is light-tailed, the sample size must grow exponentially in γ.
Cross-entropy method As an alternative to a naive Monte Carlo estimator, we consider (adap-
tive) importance sampling [4], and we use a model-based optimization procedure to find a good
importance-sampling distribution. The optimal importance-sampling distribution for estimating pγ
has the conditional density p⋆(x) = 1 {f(x) ≤ γ} p0(x)/pγ , where p0 is the density function of P0: as
p0(x)/p
⋆(x) = pγ for all x satisfying 1 {f(x) ≤ γ}, the estimate p̂⋆N,γ := 1N
∑N
i=1
p0(Xi)
p⋆(Xi)
1 {f(Xi) ≤ γ}
is exact. This sampling scheme is, unfortunately, de facto impossible, because we do not know pγ .
Instead, we use a parameterized importance sampler Pθ and employ an iterative model-based search
method to modify θ so that Pθ approximates P
⋆.
The cross-entropy method [44] iteratively tries to find θ⋆ ∈ argminθ∈ΘDkl (P ⋆||Pθ), the Kullback-
Leibler projection of P ⋆ onto the class of parameterized distributions P = {Pθ}θ∈Θ. Over iterations
k, we maintain a surrogate distribution qk(x) ∝ 1 {f(x) ≤ γk} p0(x) where γk ≥ γ is a (potentially
random) proxy for the rare-event threshold γ, and we use samples from Pθ to update θ as an
approximate projection of Q onto P. The motivation underlying this approach is to update θ so
that Pθ upweights regions of X with low objective value (i.e. unsafe) f(x). We fix a quantile level
ρ ∈ (0, 1)—usually we choose ρ ∈ [0.01, 0.2]—and use the ρ-quantile of f(X) where X ∼ Pθk as γk,
our proxy for the rare event threshold γ (see [23] for alternatives). We have the additional chal-
lenge that the ρ-quantile of f(X) is unknown, so we approximate it using i.i.d. samples Xi ∼ Pθk .
Compared to applications of the cross-entropy method [44, 55] that focus on low-dimensional prob-
lems permitting analytic updates to θ, our high-dimensional search space requires solving convex
optimization problems in each iteration. To address numerical challenges in computing likelihood
ratios in high-dimensions, our implementation carefully constrains the search space and we compute
likelihoods in logarithmic scale.
We now rigorously describe the algorithmic details. First, we use natural exponential families
as our class of importance samplers P.
Definition 1. The family of density functions {pθ}θ∈Θ, defined with respect to base measure µ, is
a natural exponential family if there exists a sufficient statistic Γ such that pθ(x) = exp(θ
⊤Γ(x)−
A(θ)) where A(θ) = log
∫
X
exp(θ⊤Γ(x))dµ(x) is the log partition function and Θ := {θ | A(θ) <∞}.
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Given this family, we consider idealized updates to the parameter vector θk at iteration k, where
we compute projections of a mixture of Qk and Pθk onto P
θk+1 = argmin
θ∈Θ
Dkl (αkQk + (1− αk)Pθk ||Pθ)
= argmax
θ∈Θ
{αkEQk [log pθ(X)] + (1− αk)Eθk [log pθ(X)]}
= argmax
θ∈Θ
{
αkθ
⊤
EQk [Γ(X)] + (1− αk)θ⊤∇A(θk)−A(θ)
}
. (2)
The term EQk [Γ(X)] is unknown in practice, so we use a sampled estimate. For Xk,1, . . . ,Xk,Nk
iid∼
Pθk , let γk be the ρ-quantile of f(Xk,1), . . . , f(Xk,Nk) and define
Dk+1 :=
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
qk(Xk,i)
pθk(Xk,i)
Γ(Xk,i) =
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
p0(Xk,i)
pθk(Xk,i)
1 {f(Xk,i) ≤ γk}Γ(Xk,i). (3)
Using the estimate Dk+1 in place of EQk [Γ(X)] in the idealized update (2), we obtain Algorithm 1.
To select the final importance sampling distribution from Algorithm 1, we choose θk with the
lowest ρ-quantile of f(Xk,i). We observe that this choice consistently improves performance over
taking the last iterate or Polyak averaging. Letting θce denote the parameters for the importance
sampling distribution learned by the cross-entropy method, we sample Xi
iid∼ Pθce and use p̂N,γ :=
1
N
∑N
i=1
p0(Xi)
pθce(Xi)
1 {f(Xi) ≤ γ} as our final importance-sampling estimator for pγ .
In the context of our rare-event simulator, we use a combination of Beta and Normal distri-
butions for Pθ. The sufficient statistics Γ include (i) the parameters of the generative model of
behaviors that our imitation-learning schemes produce and (ii) the initial poses and velocities of
other vehicles, pedestrians, and obstacles in the simulation. Given a current parameter θ and real-
ization from the model distribution Pθ, our simulator then (i) sets the parameters of the generative
model for vehicle policies and draws policies from this model, and (ii) chooses random poses and
velocities for the simulation. Our simulator is one of the largest-scale applications of cross-entropy
methods.
3 Simulation framework
Two key considerations in our risk-based framework influence design choices for our simulation
toolchain: (1) learning the base distribution P0 of nominal traffic behavior via data-driven modeling,
and (2) testing the AV as a whole system. We now describe how our toolchain achieves these goals.
3.1 Data-driven generative modeling
While our risk-based framework (cf. Section 2) is a concise, unambiguous measure of system safety,
the rare-event probability pγ is only meaningful insofar as the base distribution P0 of road conditions
and the behaviors of other (human) drivers is estimable. Thus, to implement our risk-based frame-
work, we first learn a base distribution P0 of nominal traffic behavior. Using the highway traffic
dataset NGSim [36], we train policies of human drivers via imitation learning [45, 41, 42, 22, 6]. Our
data consists of videos of highway traffic [36], and our goal is to create models that imitate human
driving behavior even in scenarios distinct from those in the data. We employ an ensemble of gen-
erative adversarial imitation learning (GAIL) [22] models to learn P0. Our approach is motivated
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by the observation that reducing an imitation-learning problem to supervised learning—where we
simply use expert data to predict actions given vehicle states—suffers from poor performance in
regions of the state space not encountered in data [41, 42]. Reinforcement-learning techniques have
been observed to improve generalization performance, as the imitation agent is able to explore
regions of the state space in simulation during training that do not necessarily occur in the expert
data traces.
Generically, GAIL is a minimax game between two functions: a discriminator Dφ and a genera-
tor Gξ (with parameters φ and ξ respectively). The discriminator takes in a state-action pair (s, u)
and outputs the probability that the pair came from real data, P(real data). The generator takes
in a state s and outputs a conditional distribution Gξ(s) := P(u | s) of the action u to take given
state s. In our context, Gξ(·) is then the (learned) policy of a human driver given environmental
inputs s. Training the generator weights ξ occurs in a reinforcement-learning paradigm with re-
ward − log(1−Dφ(s,Gξ(s))). We use the model-based variant of GAIL (MGAIL) [6] which renders
this reward fully differentiable with respect to ξ over a simulation rollout, allowing efficient model
training. GAIL has been validated by Kuefler et al. [33] to realistically mimic human-like driving
behavior from the NGSim dataset across multiple metrics. These include the similarity of low-
level actions (speeds, accelerations, turn-rates, jerks, and time-to-collision), as well as higher-level
behaviors (lane change rate, collision rate, hard-brake rate, etc). See Appendix C for a reference
to an example video of the learned model driving in a scenario alongside data traces from human
drivers.
Our importance sampling and cross-entropy methods use not just a single instance of model
parameters ξ, but rather a distribution over them to form a generative model of human driving
behavior. To model this distribution, we use a (multivariate normal) parametric bootstrap over a
trained ensemble of generators ξi, i = 1, . . . ,m. Our models ξi are high-dimensional (ξ ∈ Rd, d >
m) as they characterize the weights of large neural networks, so we employ the graphical lasso [15]
to fit the inverse covariance matrix for our ensemble. This approach to modeling uncertainty in
neural-network weights is similar to the bootstrap approach of Osband et al. [38]. Other approaches
include using dropout for inference [16] and variational methods [18, 8, 31].
While several open source driving simulators have been proposed [14, 48, 39], our problem
formulation requires unique features to allow sampling from a continuous distribution of driving
policies for environmental agents. Conditional on each sample of model parameters ξ, the simulator
constructs a (random) rollout of vehicle behaviors according to Gξ. Unlike other existing simulators,
ours is designed to efficiently execute and update these policies as new samples ξ are drawn for
each rollout.
3.2 System architecture
The second key characteristic of our framework is that it enables black-box testing the AV as a
whole system. Flaws in complex systems routinely occur at poorly specified interfaces between
components, as interactions between processes can induce unexpected behavior. Consequently,
solely testing subcomponents of an AV control pipeline separately is insufficient [1]. Moreover, it
is increasingly common for manufacturers to utilize software and hardware artifacts for which they
do not have any whitebox model [19, 12]. We provide a concise but extensible language-agnostic
interface to our benchmark world model so that common AV sensors such as cameras and lidar can
provide the necessary inputs to induce vehicle actuation commands.
Our simulator is a distributed, modular framework, which is necessary to support the inclusion
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of new AV systems and updates to the environment-vehicle policies. A benefit of this design is
that simulation rollouts are simple to parallelize. In particular, we allow instantiation of multiple
simulations simultaneously, without requiring that each include the entire set of components. For
example, a desktop may support only one instance of Unreal Engine but could be capable of simu-
lating 10 physics simulations in parallel; it would be impossible to fully utilize the compute resource
with a monolithic executable wrapping all engines together. Our architecture enables instances of
the components to be distributed on heterogeneous GPU compute clusters while maintaining the
ability to perform meaningful analysis locally on commodity desktops. In Appendix A, we detail
our scenario specification, which describes how Algorithm 1 maps onto our distributed architecture.
4 Experiments
In this section, we demonstrate our risk-based framework on a multi-agent highway scenario. As
the rare-event probability of interest pγ gets smaller, the cross-entropy method learns to sample
more rare events compared to naive Monte Carlo sampling; we empirically observe that the cross-
entropy method produces 2-20 times as many rare events as its naive counterpart. Our findings
hold across different ego-vehicle policies, base distributions P0, and scenarios.
To highlight the modularity of our simulator, we evaluate the rare-event probability pγ on two
different ego-vehicle policies. The first is an instantiation of an imitation learning (non-vision) policy
which uses lidar as its primary perceptual input. Secondly, we investigate a vision-based controller
(vision policy), where the ego-vehicle drives with an end-to-end highway autopilot network [9], tak-
ing as input a rendered image from the simulator (and lidar observations) and outputting actuation
commands. See Appendix B for a summary of network architectures used.
We consider a scenario consisting of six agents, five of which are considered part of the environ-
ment. The environment vehicles’ policies follow the distribution learned in Section 3.1. All vehicles
are constrained to start within a set of possible initial configurations consisting of pose and velocity,
and each vehicle has a goal of reaching the end of the approximately 2 km stretch of road. Fig. 1
shows one such configuration of the scenario, along with rendered images from the simulator. We
create scene geometry based on surveyors’ records and photogrammetric reconstructions of satellite
imagery of the portion of I-80 in Emeryville, California where the traffic data was collected [36].
Simulation parameters We detail our postulated base distribution P0. Letting m denote the
number of vehicles, we consider the random tuple X = (S, T,W, V, ξ) as our simulation parameter
where the pair (S, T ) ∈ Rm×2+ indicates the two-dimensional positioning of each vehicle in their
respective lanes (in meters), W the orientation of each vehicle (in degrees), and V the initial
velocity of each vehicle (in meters per second). We use ξ ∈ R404 to denote the weights of the
last layer of the neural network trained to imitate human-like driving behavior. Specifically, we
set S ∼ 40Beta(2, 2) + 80 with respect to the starting point of the road, T ∼ 0.5Beta(2, 2) − 0.25
with respect to the lane’s center, W ∼ 7.2Beta(2, 2)− 3.6 with respect to facing forward, and V ∼
10Beta(2, 2)+10. We assume ξ ∼ N (µ0,Σ0), with the mean and covariance matrices learned via the
ensemble approach outlined in Section 3.1. The neural network whose last layer is parameterized
by ξ describes the policy of environment vehicles; it takes as input the state of the vehicle and lidar
observations of the surrounding environment (see Appendix B for more details). Throughout this
section, we define our measure of safety f : X → R as the minimum time-to-collision (TTC) over
the simulation rollout. We calculate TTC from the center of mass of the ego vehicle; if the ego-
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Figure 2. The ratio of (a) number of rare events and (b) variance of estimator for pγ between cross-
entropy method and naive MC sampling for the non-vision ego policy. Rarity is inversely proportional
to γ, and, as expected, we see the best performance for our method over naive MC at small γ.
Search Algorithm γtest = 0.14 γtest = 0.15 γtest = 0.19 γtest = 0.20
Naive 1300K (12.4±3.1)e-6 (80.6±7.91)e-6 (133±3.2)e-5 (186±3.79)e-5
Cross-entropy 100K (19.8±8.88)e-6 (66.1 ± 15)e-6 (108± 9.51)e-5 (164 ± 14)e-5
Naive 100K (20±14.1)e-6 (100± 31.6)e-6 (132±11.5)e-5 (185±13.6)e-5
Table 1. Estimate of rare-event probability pγ (non-vision ego policy) with standard errors. For
the cross-entropy method, we show results for the learned importance sampling distribution with
ρ = 0.01.
vehicle’s body crashes into obstacles, we end the simulation before the TTC can further decrease
(see Appendix A for details).
Cross-entropy method Throughout our experiments, we impose constraints on the space of
importance samplers (adversarial distributions) for feasibility. Numerical stability considerations
predominantly drive our hyperparameter choices. For model parameters ξ, we also constrain the
search space to ensure that generative models Gξ maintain reasonably realistic human-like policies
(recall Sec. 3.1). For S, T,W , and V , we let {Beta(α, β) : α, β ∈ [1.5, 7]} be the model space over
which the cross-entropy method searches, scaled and centered appropriately to match the scale
of the respective base distributions. We restrict the search space of distributions over ξ ∈ R404
by searching over {N (µ,Σ0) : ‖µ− µ0‖∞ ≤ .01}, where (µ0,Σ0) are the parameters of the base
(bootstrap) distribution. For our importance sampling distribution Pθ, we use products of the above
marginal distributions. These restrictions on the search space mitigate numerical instabilities in
computing likelihood ratios within our optimization routines, which is important for our high-
dimensional problems.
We first illustrate the dependence of the cross-entropy method on its hyperparameters. We
choose to use a non-vision ego-vehicle policy as a test bed for hyperparameter tuning, since this
allows us to take advantage of the fastest simulation speeds for our experiments. We focus on the
effects (in Algorithm 1) of varying the most influential hyperparameter, ρ ∈ (0, 1], which is the
quantile level determining the rarity of the observations used to compute the importance sampler
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θk. Intuitively, as ρ approaches 0, the cross-entropy method learns importance samplers Pθ that
up-weight unsafe regions of X with lower f(x), increasing the frequency of sampling rare events
(events with f(X) ≤ γ). In order to avoid overfitting θk as ρ → 0, we need to increase Nk as ρ
decreases. Our choice of Nk is borne out of computational constraints as it is the biggest factor
that determines the run-time of the cross-entropy method. Consistent with prior works [44, 24], we
observe empirically that ρ ∈ [0.01, 0.2] is a good range for the values of Nk deemed feasible for our
computational budget (Nk = 1000 ∼ 5000). We fix the number of iterations at K = 100, number
of samples taken per iteration at Nk = 5000, step size for updates at αk = 0.8, and γ = 0.14. As
we see below, we consistently observe that the cross-entropy method learns to sample significantly
more rare events, despite the high-dimensional nature (d ≈ 500) of the problem.
To evaluate the learned parameters, we draw n = 105 samples from the importance sampling
distribution to form an estimate of pγ . In Figure 2, we vary ρ and report the relative performance of
the cross-entropy method compared to naive Monte Carlo sampling. Even though we set γ = 0.14
in Algorithm 1, we evaluate the performance of all models with respect to multiple threshold
levels γtest. We note that as ρ approaches 0, the cross-entropy method learns to frequently sample
increasingly rare events; the cross-entropy method yields 3-10 times as many dangerous scenarios,
and achieves 2-16 times variance reduction depending on the threshold level γtest. In Table 1,
we contrast the estimates provided by naive Monte Carlo and the importance sampling estimator
provided by the cross-entropy method with ρ = 0.01; to form a baseline estimate, we run naive
Monte Carlo with 1.3 · 106 samples. For a given number of samples, the cross-entropy method with
ρ = 0.01 provides more precise estimates for the rare-event probability pγ ≈ 10−5 over naive Monte
Carlo.
We now leverage the tuned hyperparameter (ρ = 0.01) for our main experiment: evaluating the
probability of a dangerous event for the vision-based ego policy. We find that the hyperparameters
for the cross-entropy method generalize, allowing us to produce good importance samplers for a
very different policy without further tuning. Based on our computational budget (with our current
implementation, vision-based simulations run about 15 times slower than simulations with only
non-vision policies), we choose K = 20 and Nk = 1000 for the cross-entropy method to learn a
good importance sampling distribution for the vision-based policy (although we also observe similar
behavior for Nk as small as 100). In Figure 3, we illustrate again that the cross-entropy method
learns to sample dangerous scenarios more frequently (Figure 3a)—up to 18 times that of naive
Monte Carlo—and produces importance sampling estimators with lower variance (Figure 3b). As a
result, our estimator in Table 2 is better calibrated compared to that computed from naive Monte
Carlo.
Qualitative analysis We provide a qualitative interpretation for the learned parameters of the
importance sampler. For initial velocities, angles, and positioning of vehicles, the importance sam-
pler shifts environmental vehicles to box in the ego-vehicle and increases the speeds of trailing
vehicles by 20%, making accidents more frequent. We also observe that the learned distribution
for initial conditions have variance 50% smaller than that of the base distribution, implying con-
centration around adversarial conditions. Perturbing the policy weights ξ for GAIL increases the
frequency of risky high-level behaviors (lane-change rate, hard-brake rate, etc.). An interesting
consequence of using our definition of TTC from the center of the ego vehicle (cf. Appendix A)
as a measure of safety is that dangerous events f(X) ≤ γtest (for small γtest) include frequent
sideswiping behavior, as such accidents result in smaller TTC values than front- or rear-end colli-
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Figure 3. The ratio of (a) number of rare events and (b) variance of estimator for pγ between
cross-entropy method and naive MC sampling for the vision-based ego policy.
Search Algorithm γtest = 0.22 γtest = 0.23 γtest = 0.24 γtest = 0.25
Cross-entropy 50K (5.87±1.82)e-5 (13.0± 2.94)e-5 (19.0 ± 3.14)e-5 (4.52 ± 1.35)e-4
Naive 50K (11.3±4.60)e-5 (20.6±6.22)e-5 (43.2±9.00)e-5 (6.75±1.13)e-4
Table 2. Estimate of rare-event probability pγ (non-vision ego policy) with standard errors. For
the cross-entropy method, we show results for the learned importance sampling distribution with
ρ = 0.01.
sions. See Appendix C for a reference to supplementary videos that exhibit the range of behavior
across many levels γtest. The modularity of our simulation framework easily allows us to modify the
safety objective to an alternative definition of TTC or even include more sophisticated notions of
safety, e.g. temporal-logic specifications or implementations of responsibility-sensitive safety (RSS)
[49, 40].
5 Related work and conclusions
Given the complexity of AV software and hardware components, it is unlikely that any single
method will serve as an oracle for certification. Many existing tools are complementary to our
risk-based framework. In this section, we compare and contrast representative results in testing,
verification, and simulation.
AV testing generally consists of three paradigms. The first, largely attributable to regulatory
efforts, uses a finite set of basic competencies (e.g. the Euro NCAP Test Protocol [46]); while
this methodology is successful in designing safety features such as airbags and seat-belts, the non-
adaptive nature of static testing is less effective in complex software systems found in AVs. Al-
ternatively, real-world testing—deployment of vehicles with human oversight—exposes the vehicle
to a wider variety of unpredictable test conditions. However, as we outlined above, these methods
pose a danger to the public and require prohibitive number of driving hours due to the rare na-
ture of accidents [29]. Simulation-based falsification (in our context, simply finding any crash) has
also been successfully utilized [51]; this approach does not maintain a link to the likelihood of the
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occurrence of a particular event, which we believe to be key in acting to prioritize and correct AV
behavior.
Formal verification methods [34, 2, 47, 37] have emerged as a candidate to reduce the intractabil-
ity of empirical validation. A verification procedure considers whether the system can ever violate
a specification and returns either a proof that there is no such execution or a counterexample. Ver-
ification procedures require a white-box description of the system (although it may be abstract),
as well as a mathematically precise specification. Due to the impossibility of certifying safety in
all scenarios, these approaches [49] require further specifications that assign blame in the case of a
crash. Such assignment of blame is impossible to completely characterize and relies on subjective
notions of fault. Our risk-based framework allows one to circumvent this difficulty by only using
a measure of safety that does not assign blame (e.g. TTC) and replacing the specifications that
assign blame with a probabilistic notion of how likely the accident is. While this approach requires
a learned model of the world P0—a highly nontrivial statistical task in itself—the adaptive impor-
tance sampling techniques we employ can still efficiently identify dangerous scenarios even when
P0 is not completely accurate. Conceptually, we view verification and our framework as comple-
mentary; they form powerful tools that can evaluate safety before deploying a fleet for real-world
testing.
Even given a consistent and complete notion of blame, verification remains highly intractable
from a computational standpoint. Efficient algorithms only exist for restricted classes of systems in
the domain of AVs, and they are fundamentally difficult to scale. Specifically, AVs—unlike previous
successful applications of verification methods to application domains such as microprocessors [5]—
include both continuous and discrete dynamics. This class of dynamics falls within the purview of
hybrid systems [35], for which exhaustive verification is largely undecidable [20].
Verifying individual components of the perception pipeline, even as standalone systems, is a
nascent, active area of research (see [3, 13, 7] and many others). Current subsystem verification
techniques for deep neural networks [28, 30, 50] do not scale to state-of-the-art models and largely
investigate the robustness of the network with respect to small perturbations of a single sample.
There are two key assumptions in these works; the label of the input is unchanged within the
radius of allowable perturbations, and the resulting expansion of the test set covers a meaningful
portion of possible inputs to the network. Unfortunately, for realistic cases in AVs it is likely that
perturbations to the state of the world which in turn generates an image should change the label.
Furthermore, the combinatorial nature of scenario configurations casts serious doubt on any claims
of coverage.
In our risk-based framework, we replace the complex system specifications required for formal
verification methods with a model P0 that we learn via imitation-learning techniques. Generative
adversarial imitation learning (GAIL) was first introduced by Ho and Ermon [22] as a way to
directly learn policies from data and has since been applied to model human driving behavior
by Kuefler et al. [33]. Model-based GAIL (MGAIL) is the specific variant of GAIL that we employ;
introduced by Baram et al. [6], MGAIL’s generative model is fully differentiable, allowing efficient
model training with standard stochastic approximation methods.
The cross-entropy method was introduced by Rubinstein [43] and has attracted interest in
many rare-event simulation scenarios [44, 32]. More broadly, it can be thought of as a model-
based optimization method [24, 25, 26, 53, 27, 56]. With respect to assessing safety of AVs, the
cross-entropy method has recently been applied in simple lane-changing and car-following scenarios
in two dimensions [54, 55]. Our work significantly extends these works by implementing a photo-
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realistic simulator that can assess the deep-learning based perception pipeline along with the control
framework. We leave the development of rare-event simulation methods that scale better with
dimension as a future work.
To summarize, a fundamental tradeoff emerges when comparing the requirements of our risk-
based framework to other testing paradigms, such as real-world testing or formal verification.
Real-world testing endangers the public but is still in some sense a gold standard. Verified sub-
systems provide evidence that the AV should drive safely even if the estimated distribution shifts,
but verification techniques are limited by computational intractability as well as the need for both
white-box models and the completeness of specifications that assign blame (e.g. [49]). In turn, our
risk-based framework is most useful when the base distribution P0 is accurate, but even when P0 is
misspecified, our adaptive importance sampling techniques can still efficiently identify dangerous
scenarios, especially those that may be missed by verification methods assigning blame. Our frame-
work offers significant speedups over real-world testing and allows efficient evaluation of black-box
AV input/output behavior, providing a powerful tool to aid in the design of safe AVs.
Acknowledgments
MOK was partially supported by a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship. AS
was partially supported by a Stanford Graduate Fellowship and a Fannie & John Hertz Foundation
Fellowship. HN was partially supported by a Samsung Fellowship and the SAIL-Toyota Center for
AI Research. JD was partially supported by the SAIL-Toyota Center for AI Research and National
Science Foundation award NSF-CAREER-1553086.
References
[1] H. Abbas, M. O’Kelly, A. Rodionova, and R. Mangharam. Safe at any speed: A simulation-
based test harness for autonomous vehicles. LNCS. Springer, 2018.
[2] M. Althoff and J. Dolan. Online verification of automated road vehicles using reachability
analysis. Robotics, IEEE Transactions on, 30(4):903–918, Aug 2014. ISSN 1552-3098. doi:
10.1109/TRO.2014.2312453.
[3] S. Arora, A. Bhaskara, R. Ge, and T. Ma. Provable bounds for learning some deep represen-
tations. In International Conference on Machine Learning, pages 584–592. , 2014.
[4] S. Asmussen and P. W. Glynn. Stochastic Simulation: Algorithms and Analysis. Springer,
2007.
[5] C. Baier, J.-P. Katoen, et al. Principles of model checking, volume 26202649. MIT press
Cambridge, 2008.
[6] N. Baram, O. Anschel, I. Caspi, and S. Mannor. End-to-end differentiable adversarial imitation
learning. In International Conference on Machine Learning, pages 390–399, 2017.
[7] P. L. Bartlett, D. J. Foster, and M. J. Telgarsky. Spectrally-normalized margin bounds for
neural networks. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 6241–6250. ,
2017.
[8] C. Blundell, J. Cornebise, K. Kavukcuoglu, and D. Wierstra. Weight uncertainty in neural
networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1505.05424, 2015.
12
[9] M. Bojarski, D. Del Testa, D. Dworakowski, B. Firner, B. Flepp, P. Goyal, L. D. Jackel,
M. Monfort, U. Muller, J. Zhang, et al. End to end learning for self-driving cars. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1604.07316, 2016.
[10] J.-F. Bonnefon, A. Shariff, and I. Rahwan. The social dilemma of autonomous vehicles.
Science, 352(6293):1573–1576, 2016. ISSN 0036-8075. doi: 10.1126/science.aaf2654. URL
http://science.sciencemag.org/content/352/6293/1573.
[11] J. Bucklew. Introduction to rare event simulation. Springer Science & Business Media, 2013.
[12] M. Cheah, S. A. Shaikh, J. Bryans, and H. N. Nguyen. Combining third party components
securely in automotive systems. In IFIP International Conference on Information Security
Theory and Practice, pages 262–269. Springer, 2016.
[13] N. Cohen, O. Sharir, and A. Shashua. On the expressive power of deep learning: A tensor
analysis. In Conference on Learning Theory, pages 698–728. , 2016.
[14] A. Dosovitskiy, G. Ros, F. Codevilla, A. Lopez, and V. Koltun. CARLA: An open urban
driving simulator. In Proceedings of the 1st Annual Conference on Robot Learning, pages
1–16, 2017.
[15] J. Friedman, T. Hastie, and R. Tibshirani. Sparse inverse covariance estimation with the
graphical lasso. Biostatistics, 9(3):432–441, 2008.
[16] Y. Gal and Z. Ghahramani. Dropout as a bayesian approximation: Representing model un-
certainty in deep learning. In International Conference on Machine Learningearning, pages
1050–1059, 2016.
[17] E. Games. Unreal engine 4 documentation. URL https://docs. unrealengine.
com/latest/INT/index. html, 2015.
[18] A. Graves. Practical variational inference for neural networks. In Advances in Neural Infor-
mation Processing Systems, pages 2348–2356, 2011.
[19] H. Heinecke, K.-P. Schnelle, H. Fennel, J. Bortolazzi, L. Lundh, J. Leflour, J.-L. Mate´,
K. Nishikawa, and T. Scharnhorst. Automotive open system architecture-an industry-wide
initiative to manage the complexity of emerging automotive e/e-architectures. Technical re-
port, SAE Technical Paper, 2004.
[20] T. A. Henzinger, P. W. Kopke, A. Puri, and P. Varaiya. What’s decidable about hybrid
automata? J. Comput. Syst. Sci., 57(1):94–124, 1998.
[21] P. Hintjens. ZeroMQ: messaging for many applications. ” O’Reilly Media, Inc.”, 2013.
[22] J. Ho and S. Ermon. Generative adversarial imitation learning. In Advances in Neural Infor-
mation Processing Systems, pages 4565–4573, 2016.
[23] T. Homem-de Mello. A study on the cross-entropy method for rare-event probability estima-
tion. INFORMS Journal on Computing, 19(3):381–394, 2007.
[24] J. Hu and P. Hu. On the performance of the cross-entropy method. In Simulation Conference
(WSC), Proceedings of the 2009 Winter, pages 459–468. IEEE, 2009.
[25] J. Hu and P. Hu. Annealing adaptive search, cross-entropy, and stochastic approximation in
global optimization. Naval Research Logistics (NRL), 58(5):457–477, 2011.
[26] J. Hu, P. Hu, and H. S. Chang. A stochastic approximation framework for a class of randomized
optimization algorithms. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 57(1):165–178, 2012.
13
[27] J. Hu, E. Zhou, and Q. Fan. Model-based annealing random search with stochastic averaging.
ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer Simulation (TOMACS), 24(4):21, 2014.
[28] X. Huang, M. Kwiatkowska, S. Wang, and M. Wu. Safety verification of deep neural networks.
In International Conference on Computer Aided Verification, pages 3–29. Springer, 2017.
[29] N. Kalra and S. M. Paddock. Driving to safety: How many miles of driving would it take
to demonstrate autonomous vehicle reliability? Transportation Research Part A: Policy and
Practice, 94:182–193, 2016.
[30] G. Katz, C. Barrett, D. Dill, K. Julian, and M. Kochenderfer. Reluplex: An efficient smt
solver for verifying deep neural networks. arXiv:1702.01135 [cs.AI], 1:1, 2017.
[31] D. P. Kingma, T. Salimans, and M. Welling. Variational dropout and the local reparam-
eterization trick. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 2575–2583,
2015.
[32] D. P. Kroese, R. Y. Rubinstein, and P. W. Glynn. The cross-entropy method for estimation.
Handbook of Statistics: Machine Learning: Theory and Applications, 31:19–34, 2013.
[33] A. Kuefler, J. Morton, T. Wheeler, and M. Kochenderfer. Imitating driver behavior with
generative adversarial networks. In Intelligent Vehicles Symposium (IV), 2017 IEEE, pages
204–211. IEEE, 2017.
[34] M. Kwiatkowska, G. Norman, and D. Parker. Prism 4.0: Verification of probabilistic real-time
systems. In International conference on computer aided verification, pages 585–591. Springer,
2011.
[35] J. Lygeros. Lecture notes on hybrid systems. In Notes for an ENSIETA workshop, 2004.
[36] U. D. of Transportation FHWA. Ngsim – next generation simulation, 2008.
[37] M. O’Kelly, H. Abbas, S. Gao, S. Shiraishi, S. Kato, and R. Mangharam. Apex: Autonomous
vehicle plan verification and execution. volume 1, Apr 2016.
[38] I. Osband, C. Blundell, A. Pritzel, and B. Van Roy. Deep exploration via bootstrapped dqn.
In Advances in neural information processing systems, pages 4026–4034, 2016.
[39] C. Quiter and M. Ernst. Deepdrive. https://github.com/deepdrive/deepdrive, 2018.
[40] N. Roohi, R. Kaur, J. Weimer, O. Sokolsky, and I. Lee. Self-driving vehicle verification towards
a benchmark. arXiv preprint arXiv:1806.08810, 2018.
[41] S. Ross and D. Bagnell. Efficient reductions for imitation learning. In Proceedings of the
thirteenth international conference on artificial intelligence and statistics, pages 661–668, 2010.
[42] S. Ross, G. Gordon, and D. Bagnell. A reduction of imitation learning and structured prediction
to no-regret online learning. In Proceedings of the fourteenth international conference on
artificial intelligence and statistics, pages 627–635, 2011.
[43] R. Y. Rubinstein. Combinatorial optimization, cross-entropy, ants and rare events. In Stochas-
tic optimization: algorithms and applications, pages 303–363. Springer, 2001.
[44] R. Y. Rubinstein and D. P. Kroese. The cross-entropy method: A unified approach to Monte
Carlo simulation, randomized optimization and machine learning. Information Science &
Statistics, Springer Verlag, NY, 2004.
[45] S. Russell. Learning agents for uncertain environments. In Proceedings of the eleventh annual
conference on Computational learning theory, pages 101–103. ACM, 1998.
14
[46] R. Schram, A. Williams, and M. van Ratingen. Implementation of autonomous emergency
braking (aeb), the next step in euro ncaps safety assessment. ESV, Seoul, 2013.
[47] S. A. Seshia, D. Sadigh, and S. S. Sastry. Formal methods for semi-autonomous driving. In
Proceedings of the 52nd Annual Design Automation Conference, page 148. ACM, 2015.
[48] S. Shah, D. Dey, C. Lovett, and A. Kapoor. Airsim: High-fidelity visual and phys-
ical simulation for autonomous vehicles. In Field and Service Robotics, 2017. URL
https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.05065.
[49] S. Shalev-Shwartz, S. Shammah, and A. Shashua. On a formal model of safe and scalable
self-driving cars. arXiv preprint arXiv:1708.06374, 2017.
[50] V. Tjeng and R. Tedrake. Verifying neural networks with mixed integer programming.
arXiv:1711.07356 [cs.LG], 2017.
[51] C. E. Tuncali, T. P. Pavlic, and G. Fainekos. Utilizing s-taliro as an automatic test generation
framework for autonomous vehicles. In Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSC), 2016 IEEE
19th International Conference on, pages 1470–1475. IEEE, 2016.
[52] K. Vogel. A comparison of headway and time to collision as safety indicators. Accident analysis
& prevention, 35(3):427–433, 2003.
[53] Z. B. Zabinsky. Stochastic adaptive search for global optimization, volume 72. Springer Science
& Business Media, 2013.
[54] D. Zhao. Accelerated Evaluation of Automated Vehicles. Ph.D. thesis, Department of Mechan-
ical Engineering, University of Michigan, 2016.
[55] D. Zhao, X. Huang, H. Peng, H. Lam, and D. J. LeBlanc. Accelerated evaluation of automated
vehicles in car-following maneuvers. IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems,
19(3):733–744, 2018.
[56] E. Zhou and J. Hu. Gradient-based adaptive stochastic search for non-differentiable optimiza-
tion. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 59(7):1818–1832, 2014.
15
A Scenario specification
A scenario specification consists of a scenario description and outputs both pγ (1), the accident rate,
and a dataset consisting of initial conditions and the minimum time to collision, our continuous
objective safety measure. Concretely, a scenario description includes
• a set of possible initial conditions, e.g. a range of velocities and poses for each agent
• a safety measure specification for the ego agent,
• a generative model of environment policies, an ego vehicle model,
• a world geometry model, e.g.a textured mesh of the static scene in which the scenario is to
take place.
Given the scenario description, the search module creates physics and rendering engine worker
instances, and Algorithm 1 then adaptively searches through many perturbations of conditions in
the scenario, which we call scenario realizations. A set of scenario realizations may be mapped to
multiple physics, rendering, and agent instantiations, evaluated in parallel, and reduced by a sink
node which reports a measure of each scenarios performance relative to the specification.
In our implementation the safety measure is minimum time-to-collision (TTC). TTC is defined
as the time it would take for two vehicles to intercept one another given that they each maintain
their current heading and velocity [52]. The TTC between the ego-vehicle and vehicle i is given by
TTCi(t) = −ri(t)
r˙i(t)
, (4)
where ri is the distance between the ego vehicle and vehicle i, and r˙i the time derivative of this
distance (which is simply computed by projecting the relative velocity of vehicle i onto the vector
between the vehicles’ poses).
In this paper, vehicles are described as oriented rectangles in the 2D plane. Since we are
interested in the time it would take for the ego-vehicle to intersect the polygonal boundary of
another vehicle on the road, we utilize a finite set of range and range measurements in order to
approximate the TTC metric. For a given configuration of vehicles, we compute N uniformly
spaced angles θ1, . . . , θN in the range [0, 2π] with respect to the ego vehicle’s orientation and cast
rays outward from the center of the ego vehicle. For each direction we compute the distance which
a ray could travel before intersecting one of the M other vehicles in the environment. These form
N range measurements s1, . . . , sN . Further, for each ray si, we determine which vehicle (if any)
that ray hit; projecting the relative velocity of this vehicle with respect to ego vehicle gives the
range-rate measurement s˙i. Finally, we approximate the minimum TTC for a given simulation
rollout X of length T discrete time steps by:
f(X) := min
t=0,...,T
(
min
i=1,...,N
−si(t)
s˙i(t)
)
Note that this measure can approximate the true TTC arbitrarily well via choice of N and the
discretization of time used by the simulator. Furthermore, note that our definition of TTC is with
respect to the center of the ego vehicle touching the boundary of another vehicle. Crashing, on the
other hand, is defined in our simulation as the intersection of boundaries of two vehicles. Thus,
TTC values we evaluate in our simulation are nonzero even during crashes, since the center of the
ego vehicle has not yet collided with the boundary of another vehicle.
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Figure 4: Depiction of lidar sensor input used for GAIL models.
B Network architectures
The MGAIL generator model we use takes the same inputs as that of Kuefler et al. [33]—the
dynamical states of the vehicle as well as virtual lidar beam reflections. Specifically, we take as
inputs: geometric parameters (vehicle length/width), dynamical states (vehicle speed, lateral and
angular offsets with respect to the center and heading of the lane, distance to left and right lane
boundaries, and local lane curvature), three indicators for collision, road departure, and traveling
in reverse, and lidar sensor observations (ranges and range-rates of 20 lidar beams) as depicted in
Figure 4. The generator has two hidden layers of 200 and 100 neurons. The output consists of the
mean and variance of normal distributions for throttle and steering commands; we then sample
from these distributions to draw a given vehicle’s action. The discriminator shares the same size
for hidden layers. The forward model used to allow fully-differentiable training first encodes both
the state and action through a 150 neuron layer and also adds a GRU layer to the state encoding.
A Hadamard product of the results creates a joint embedding which is put through three hidden
layers each of 150 neurons. The output is a prediction of the next state.
The end-to-end highway autopilot model is a direct implementation of Bojarski et al. [9] via the
code found at the link https://github.com/sullychen/autopilot-tensorflow. In our imple-
mentation of the vision-based policy, this highway autopilot model uses rendered images to produce
steering commands. Lidar inputs are used to generate throttle commands using the same network
as the non-vision policy.
C Supplementary videos
We have provided some videos to augment the analysis in our paper (available in the NeurIPS
supplement and at http://amansinha.org/docs/OKellySiNaDuTe18_videos.zip):
• gail.mp4 provides an example of a trained GAIL model driving alongside data traces from
real human drivers [36].
• Example videos from rollouts. The filenames start with “mttc =” to indicate the minimum
TTC that resulted between the ego and any other vehicle during the rollout. Note that even
crashes have nonzero values of TTC due to the definition we used for TTC from the center
of the ego vehicle (cf. Appendix A). The videos are all played back at 2.5× real-time speed.
The videos included in the supplement are:
– Crashes:
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∗ mttc = 0.23 − crash.mp4
∗ mttc = 0.30.mp4
∗ mttc = 0.42.mp4
∗ mttc = 0.56.mp4
– Non-crashes:
∗ mttc = 0.23 − nocrash.mp4
∗ mttc = 0.79.mp4
∗ mttc = 1.43.mp4
∗ mttc = 2.01.mp4
∗ mttc = 3.05.mp4
∗ mttc = 6.00.mp4
∗ mttc = 6.01.mp4
∗ mttc = 10.11.mp4
These videos contain overhead, RGB, segmented, and depth views. We also include higher-
resolution RGB videos with the same base names as above but the extension “ hires.mp4”.
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